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Abstract 
This EUCROSS Working paper analyses the European regional order in the Western Balkans 
which is more and more challenged by the projection of the emerging powers in this region. In 
other words, it aims to analyses the new international balance of power in the context of the 
diffusion of global power in a changing world order. The paper is divided into three parts. The 
first part explains particularly the context of the penetration of emerging powers into a 
European space as is the region of the Western Balkans. The second focus on their objectives 
and strategies to challenge the European regional order. Finally, the third studies the European 
response in order to remain the most visible player in the Western Balkans. 
 
Keywords 
Western Balkans, European Union, Emerging powers. 
 
About the author 
Liridon Lika is lecturer and researcher/PhD Candidate at the Center for International Relations 
Studies (CEFIR) of the Department of Political Science of the University of Liège (ULiège) in 
Belgium. He obtained a master’s degree in Political Science: International Relations at ULiège, 
and an advanced master’s degree in Interdisciplinary Analysis of European integration at the 
Institute for European Studies (ISE) of the Free University of Brussels (ULB). His research 
focuses on Western Balkan states (in particular Kosovo and Albania), EU external action, and 
the foreign policy of the emerging powers towards the Western Balkans. E-mail: 
Liridon.Lika@uliege.be  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
3 
 
Table of Content 
 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................. 4 
2. The context of the penetration of emerging powers in the Western Balkans ............... 5 
3. The objectives and strategies of emerging powers to challenge the European regional 
order in the Western Balkans ............................................................................................. 8 
4. The recent European enlargement initiatives in the Western Balkans ........................16 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................19 
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
4 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the face of this changing international context, the European Union (EU) and some of its 
Member States have raised awareness by recently launching several enlargement initiatives. 
In order to prepare for future membership the six Western Balkan states (WB6) – Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia – and shape their 
institutional identities through the export of their norms and values, the EU and some of its 
Member States have recently launched several initiatives such as the establishment of the 
Berlin Process (2014-2018), the adoption by the European Commission of a enlargement 
strategy (2018) and the Sofia Summit (2018). 
Indeed, following the summits of Zagreb and Feira (2000), and especially that of 
Thessaloniki (2003), the EU promised its enlargement towards the Western Balkan countries 
according to the so-called case-by-case or merit principle. Nonetheless, since 2008, the EU 
as a normative and civilian power has been weakened by multiple crises (economic, political, 
migratory) which have also affected the process of enlargement and Europeanization of the 
Western Balkans. For reasons both internal and external to the states of the Western Balkans 
and to the EU itself, they have not yet joined the common European project and the EU 
enlargement process has slowed down. In this context, international or regional emerging 
powers such as Russia, China and Turkey have taken advantage of the situation to project 
themselves and increase their influence in the region, thus competing with the EU. They are 
projecting their influence in the Western Balkans into varying degrees and fields as diverse as 
political, economic, financial, commercial, military, ideological, cultural or religious. 
This contribution aims to answer the central question of the contests posed by the 
penetration of emerging powers in the Western Balkans for the European regional order in this 
region. In other words, it aims to analyses the new international balance of power in the context 
of the diffusion of global power in a changing world order. Concretely, how the emerging 
powers are challenging the European regional order in the Western Balkans? How the EU and 
its Member States are facing the projection of emerging powers in the region? This paper will 
try to provide answers to these various questions. 
To do this, the first part will be devoted particularly to the context of the penetration of 
emerging powers into a European space as is the region of the Western Balkans. In the 
second, the study will focus on their objectives and strategies to challenge the European 
regional order. Finally, in the third, the analysis will aim to explain European response in order 
to remain the most visible player in the Western Balkans. 
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2. The context of the penetration of emerging powers in the Western Balkans 
 
Since the end of the wars of the 1990s in the Western Balkans, European authorities had come 
up with a new strategy that was presented at the Feira Summit (2000) and from Zagreb (2000). 
This strategy declared for the first time Western Balkan countries as potential candidates for 
membership1. Later, at the Thessaloniki Summit (2003), the European perspective of these 
countries is also reaffirmed2. This ambitious vision aimed to put an end to the long democratic 
transition in order to transform the Western Balkans into a region of peace, stability and 
economic prosperity, the ultimate goal of which would be its full membership of the EU. This 
strategy is called the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). Through this twofold 
objective, the EU wanted, first of all, to stabilize this heterogeneous region and, secondly, to 
allow these countries to adhere definitively to the common European project. The SAP had 
created great hopes for change in the Western Balkans, fueled by the previous waves of 
enlargement (2004 and 2007) towards the former communist countries of the Central and 
Eastern Europe3. 
Beyond geostrategic and economic interests, security was undoubtedly one of the main 
reasons that led the EU to open up to these countries. The security issue also presents the 
main motivation for the Western Balkan states to join the EU, which is perceived as a pole of 
attraction capable of neutralizing conflicts and pacifying the region4. In other words, the 
insecurity, the conflicts, the difficulties encountered for the reconstruction and the reconciliation 
of the various states, hostile to each other, as well as the improvement of its very image, 
pushed the EU and its Member States to play a more active role in the Western Balkans, 
adopting an enlargement strategy. Since then, the EU has become a key player in the region5. 
The European Commission has made consistent efforts to strengthen its transformative power 
to support the implementation of reforms, particularly in the areas of rule of law and economic 
governance in the region6. This enlargement policy, based on a pre-accession strategy, 
consisted in an Europeanization process and transmit of the acquis communautaire to future 
                                                          
1 Santa Maria da Feira European Council, “Presidency Conclusions”, Santa Maria da Feira, June 19 and 20, 2000. 
2 EU-Western Balkans Summit, “Declaration”, Thessaloniki, 21 June, 2003. 
3 Arolda Elbasani, “EU enlargement in the Western Balkans: strategies of borrowing and inventing”, Journal of 
Southern Europe and the Balkans, n° 10/3, 2008, p. 306. 
4 Liridon Lika, “Risques et défis sécuritaires de la (non)-intégration des Balkans occidentaux dans l’Union 
européenne”, in Sophie Wintgens, Geoffrey Grandjean, Stéphanie Vanhaeren (ed.), L’insécurité en question : 
définition, enjeux et perspectives, Liège, Éditions Presses Universitaires de Liège, 2015, pp. 123-124. 
5 Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, London and New York, Routledge, 
2006, p. 147. 
6 European Commission, “Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2014-15”, Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, Brussels, 8.10.2014, COM(2014) 700 final, p. 1. 
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Western Balkan members7. By applying conditionality principles as in previous enlargements8 
and disseminating its standards, values and norms, it has worked to ensure security, stability, 
regional cooperation and to affirm respect for human rights, the consolidation of democracy, 
the establishment of a model market economy and the rule of law. Thus, Europeanization of 
the Western Balkans is based on democratization, the need for regional stability, the 
strengthening of the rule of law and the creation of a viable market economy9. This European 
strategy towards the Western Balkans fits with Ian Manners’s statement that the EU is a 
normative power, based on a solid foundation of values, norms and an identity that guides its 
foreign policy10. Others, like Mario Telò, claim that the EU is an incipient civilian power based 
on multilateralism, socio-economic influence, enlargement, or multi-level governance11. This 
civilian power would result from a combination of a specific social model within the EU and the 
promotion of certain values coupled with a vision of regional power abroad. The EU assistance 
was conditional on respect for European norms and values and aimed at institutional building12. 
Dimitar Bechev demonstrated that “[b]eyond the carrot-and-stick strategies proceeding from 
the application of membership conditionality, the EU has wielded considerable ideational 
power as promoter of certain normative notions of appropriate state behavior”13. 
However, the balance sheet (results) of the enlargement policy remains mixed. The 
WB6 are dragging on in this process. Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia have 
already achieved candidate country status. These four states are therefore more advanced in 
the accession process. However, there are differences between them: Montenegro (since 
2012) and Serbia (since 2014) have opened accession negotiations, while Albania and North 
Macedonia hope to open as soon as possible (during 2019) the first chapters of negotiations. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo both have still potential candidate status, which means 
that they are currently further away in the accession process. Thus, the WB6 have not 
progressed at the same pace, because it is conditioned by the so-called “merit principle”, which 
is strongly criticized by some in the name of a collective regional policy that promotes the block 
membership of WB6 in order to avoid the dividing lines and the gap between the pioneers and 
the latecomers; in a region marked by post-conflict trauma, competition has not proved very 
                                                          
7 Othon Anastasakis, “The Europeanisation of the Balkans”, Brown Journal of World Affairs, vol. 12, n° 1, 2005, p. 
78. 
8 Stephan Keukeleire and Tom Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014, p. 209. 
9 Geoffrey Pridham, “Democratizing the Western Balkans: challenges and burdens for the European Union”, 
International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, vol. 17, n° 3, 2008, pp. 86-89. 
10 Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of Common Market Studies (JCMS), 
vol. 40. n° 2, 2002, p. 252.  
11 Mario Telò, “The EU as an incipient civilian power. A systemic approach », Politique européenne, n° 22, 2007/2, 
pp. 37-42.  
12 Lucia Quaglia, Mari Neuvonen, Machiko Miyakashi and Michelle Cini, “Europeanization”, in Michelle Cini (eds.), 
European Union Politics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 405-419. 
13 Dimitar Bechev, “Carrots, sticks and norms: the EU and regional cooperation in Southeast Europe”, Journal of 
Southern Europe and the Balkans, vol. 8, n° 1, 2006, p. 28. 
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constructive so far because values dear to the EU such as formation of collective identity, 
cooperation, solidarity and trust have been neglected14. For example, the disputes between 
Greece and North Macedonia over the name of the latter consisted an unsolved problem until 
2019, which also had consequences for the enlargement of the EU. Nowadays, two challenges 
remain still to be closed before accession to the EU, namely constitutional reforms in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and the normalization of bilateral relations and reciprocal official recognition 
between the Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of Serbia.  
The Western Balkans is an important geostrategic region for international actors such 
as the United States and the EU. However, Washington’s commitments in other parts of the 
world, such as the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya or more recently in Syria, and the EU’s 
concerns about its own economic and political problems have created a political, economic 
and security vacuum in the region15. Believing that the democratic future of the Western 
Balkans was tied to the EU, Washington largely entrusted the EU with responsibility for the 
political, institutional and economic development of the region; something it has not managed 
to fully assume, leaving space for action for other emerging international actors. The European 
crisis had spillover effects for the Western Balkans, leading to a relative lack of interest on the 
part of the EU, whose objectives and commitments for enlargement to the region proved slow 
and difficult. Political inertia in the EU – combined with internal concerns, economic and 
refugee crises, and pressures from far-right parties – meant that the Western Balkan states 
could not engage reforms necessary for any form of integration, neither ‘internal’ nor with the 
EU. Since 2008, some EU Member States have experienced successive waves of economic 
and financial crises that have led to the adoption of austerity policies that have affected both 
the Eurozone and the EU Member States and those of the Western Balkans16. Between 2008 
and 2014, all states in the region were experiencing a decline of industrial production, a rise of 
unemployment, a contraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) and remittances from the 
diaspora; and this has led to a significant increase in the activities of a number of international 
financial institutions in the region, particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF)17. The 
negative effects of the crisis in the Western Balkans have also been felt in the area of banking 
and financial services. This sector is more particularly controlled by institutions of the EU 
Member States (Austria, Italy, France, Slovenia and Greece). Interdependence exposed the 
countries of the Western Balkans to the crisis in the Eurozone. In other words, all the political 
                                                          
14 Florent Marciacq, “The EU and the Western Balkans after the Berlin Process. Reflecting on the EU Enlargement 
in Times of Uncertainty”, The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Sarajevo, 2017, p. 17. 
15 Gordon N. Bardos, “The Balkans, Post-Pax Americana”, The National Interest, October 1, 2012, 
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-balkans-post-pax-americana-7537, (accessed on May 28, 2019). 
16 John O’ Brennan, “‘On the Slow Train to Nowhere?’ The European Union, ‘Enlargement Fatigue’ and the Western 
Balkans”, European Foreign Affairs Review, 19, n° 2, 2014, p. 231. 
17 Ritsa Panagiotou, “The Greek crisis as a crisis of EU enlargement: how will the Western Balkans be affected?”, 
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 13, n° 1, 2013, pp. 91-92; Riinvest, “The Power of Diaspora!”, 
Institute for Development Research Riinvest, Prishtina, Republic of Kosovo, April 14, 2017. 
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and economic problems of the Western Balkans, combined with the economic setbacks of the 
EU and the “fatigue of enlargement” have contributed to the creation of a relative “power 
vacuum” in the region18. This state of affairs is defined by Flor Avelino and Jan Rotmans as 
“[…] a situation in which a contingency impedes the exercise of systemic power; the 
[international] environment confronts actors with a new situation while they are not able to 
mobilize the necessary resources to deal with it”19. As a result, the influences of Russia, Turkey 
and China have increased sharply in the region. The latters have adopted different strategies 
to set up themselves in the region. Delays in EU membership and growth of the influence of 
emerging powers in the Western Balkans are also associated with the dynamics of the region’s 
states20. Thus, the procrastination and the European crises (2008-2014) have had some 
geopolitical consequences for the Western Balkans and the European regional order. 
 
3. The objectives and strategies of emerging powers to challenge the European 
regional order in the Western Balkans 
 
The concept of power is central to the study of International Relations. Realism postulates that 
states seek alliances and power balances. And it is precisely the national interest which, based 
on the power and the anarchistic competition between the states, leads according to Hans J. 
Morgenthau to a balance of power in the sense that they threaten each other21. In addition, the 
founder of neorealist theory of International Relations, Kenneth N. Waltz, proposes a set of 
criteria for defining a great power: “[…] size of population and territory, resource endowment, 
economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence”22. According to Waltz, 
the international structure is anarchic, since no political authority supplants those of sovereign 
states: “[a]mong men as among states, anarchy, or the absence of government, is associated 
with the occurrence of violence”23. Raymond Aron, on the other hand, defines “[...] power on 
the international stage [as] the ability of a political unit to impose its will on other units”24. In the 
analysis of the power of an actor, Joseph Nye mobilizes two notions of power, namely hard 
power based on the military and economic factor, and soft power considered as an indirect 
means of influence (the seduction capacity of a country to achieve its own goals, without using 
force, but through intangible resources such as attraction, positive image, values and 
                                                          
18 Othon Anastasakis, “Turkey’s Assertive Presence in Southeast Europe: Between Identity Politics and Elite 
Pragmatism”, in Kerem Öktem, Ayşe Kadıoğlu, Mehmet Karlı (ed.), Another Empire? A decade of Turkey’s Foreign 
Policy Under the Justice and Development Party, Istanbul, Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2012, p. 202. 
19 Flor Avelino and Jan Rotmans, “Power in Transition An Interdisciplinary Framework to Study Power in Relation 
to Structural Change”, European Journal of Social Theory, 12, n° 4, 2009, p. 555. 
20 Solveig Richter & Natasha Wunsch, “Money, power, glory: the linkages between EU conditionality and state 
capture in the Western Balkans”, Journal of European Public Policy, February 2019, pp. 6-17. 
21 Hans J. Morgenthau revised by Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics among nations: The Struggle for Power and 
Peace, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Sixth Edition, 1985, p. 189. 
22 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, London, Addison-Wesley, 1979, p. 131. 
23 Ibid., p. 102. 
24 Raymond Aron, Paix et Guerre entre les Nations, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 2004, p. 58. 
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culture)25. In this perspective, power would consist of material and immaterial elements. The 
first, quantified, apprehend population, territory, natural resources, economic strength or 
military force, while the second, non-quantified, would include the national cohesion, ideology, 
culture, religion and influence on international institutions. But to complete this definition, 
according to Sebastian Santander, the representation, perception, and recognition of the actor 
must also be taken into account26. 
Following the disappearance of the bipolar world and in the post-2000 international 
context, the EU is challenged by the rise of emerging powers at the global level. Even if the 
emerging powers do not always have a common vision and do not form a homogeneous block, 
they see themselves as the future while the EU as the past. For Sebastian Santander, the 
emerging powers promote the spread of global power and gradually calling into question the 
international order that has been dominated for centuries by the traditional Western powers27. 
The great emerging powers first appeared under the acronym BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and 
China) devised by the researcher Jim O’Neill of the international bank Goldman Sachs as a 
practical label to qualify these countries28. Other waves of emerging middle powers later 
gathered under the acronym CIVETS, grouping together Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, 
Turkey and South Africa, or under the abbreviation MIKTA: Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, 
Turkey and Australia. Thus, whereas China and Russia are usually considered as great 
emerging powers, according to Ariel Gonzalez Levaggi,“Turkey is an emerging middle power 
that has developed a near-BRICS active foreign policy while is member of the G-20 and MIKTA 
group, even if in the last years his label is increasingly contested”29. In other words, Turkey, 
which display and projects economic, military, political, and ideological influence especially but 
not exclusively in its near region, is qualified by scholars as an emerging middle power30. In 
summary, since the first decade of this century China, Russia and Turkey had sustained 
economic development and did not hesitate to deploy efforts to increase their presence on the 
world stage by adopting ambitious and multidimensional policies both regionally and 
internationally. 
As the EU procrastinated, China, Russia and Turkey were actively working to increase 
their influence in the Western Balkans. Just as in the past when it was a crossroads of interests 
                                                          
25 Joseph S. Nye JR, The Paradox of American Power, New York, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 4-9. 
26 Sebastian Santander, “Ordre mondial, hégémonie et puissances émergentes”, in Sebastian Santander (eds.), 
L’émergence des nouvelles puissances : vers un système multipolaire ?, Paris, Ellipses, 2009, p. 24. 
27 Sebastian Santander (eds.), Puissances émergentes : un défi pour l’Europe ?, Paris, Ellipses, 2012, p. 10. 
28 Goldman Sachs, “Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050”, Global Economics, Paper n° 99, 2003, p. 2. 
29 Ariel Gonzalez Levaggi, “Towards the peripheries of the Western World: Eurasian regional policies in Latin 
America”, Anuario de Integración, n° 3, 2016, pp. 62-63. 
30 Jana J. Jabbour, La Turquie: L’invention d’une diplomatie émergente, Paris, CNRS Éditions, 2017, pp. 27-28; 
Emel Parlar Dal, “Profiling Middle Powers in Global Governance and the Turkish Case: An Introduction”, in Emel 
Parlar Dal (eds.), Middle Powers in Global Governance: The Rise of Turkey, Cham, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, pp. 
1-32; Federico Donelli and Ariel Gonzalez Levaggi, “Becoming Global Actor: Te Turkish Agenda for the Global 
South”, Rising Powers Quarterly, vol. 1, Issue 2, 2016, pp. 93-115. 
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of many major foreign powers, the region again represents an important strategic crossroads. 
Based on the balance of power, the game of alliances and geopolitical issues, the great 
European powers became involved in the Balkans during the conferences of Berlin (1878), 
London (1913) and Versailles (1919). The Western Balkans have again turned into a 
competitive arena between the great powers, as in the nineteenth century31, through the 
penetration and political, economic and military growth of Russia in Serbia, in the federated 
entity of the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Macedonia. For its part, 
Turkey has also projected its multidimensional influence in states such as Albania, Kosovo, 
North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also in Serbia and parts of Montenegro. 
As for China, it prints its economic and financial influence, particularly in Serbia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, North Macedonia and Montenegro. The difference from the nineteenth century 
is that Russia and Turkey are two powers that historically had designs, while China is a recent 
power for the region. 
With regard to Russia, Moscow stated that it had great ambitions of influence in the 
Western Balkans which, from its point of view, constitute a geostrategic region, reason why, 
as in the past, the authorities under the presidency of Vladimir Putin, manifested aims towards 
it32. There is therefore a return, or a progressive influence, of Russia in some countries of the 
Western Balkans. Moscow continues to promote its own political, economic and traditional ties 
with some countries in the region, presenting itself to them as a closer ally than the EU. Over 
the centuries, it has claimed a special relationship with the Slavic and Orthodox communities 
of the Western Balkans. This perception is also rooted in the Slavic and Orthodox population 
of the region, mainly in Serbia, which currently holds the status of candidate country to the EU. 
Serbs and Russians share close historical, political, religious and cultural ties. Serbia is a 
Russophile country and Vladimir Putin enjoys a solid popularity; and, at the same time, it is 
progressing in the agenda of accession to the European project. At a time when relations 
between Russia and the West are at the lowest, Serbia is positioning itself between the two, 
insisting that European integration is in its eyes a priority, while maintaining close ties with its 
traditional Russian ally. 
The apparent aims and tactics of Russia were to create a bloc of four neutral states, even pro-
Russian, that would encompass the vast majority of Slavic and Orthodox Christians in Serbia, 
Montenegro, North Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina33. In order to pursue this geopolitical 
objective, Moscow has created numerous networks of organizations operating in these four 
                                                          
31 Blerim Reka, “History is back in the Balkans”, Geopolitical Intelligence services (GIS), July 15, 2016, 
https://www.gisreportsonline.com/history-is-back-in-the-balkans,politics,1918,report.html, (accessed 
on May 9, 2019). 
32 Vsevolod Samokhvalov, Russian-European Relations in the Balkans and Black Sea Region. Great Power Identity 
and the Idea of Europe, Cham, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, pp. 169-209. 
33 Jonathan Stevenson (ed.), “Balkan rumblings”, Strategic Comments, The International Institute for Strategic 
Studies (IISS), vol. 23, n° 20, June 20, 2017, p. 1. 
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countries whose political representatives made frequent trips to Russia. Many of them also 
signed a cooperation agreement with President Vladimir Putin’s “United Russia” party. Russian 
policymakers also expressed their support for anti-Western parties and governments, such as: 
in North Macedonia, support for the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), in power 
from December 2006 to May 2017; in Montenegro, considerable financial support for the 
November 2016 elections to the Democratic Front (FD), the political party of the Serbian 
minority opposing Montenegrin membership in NATO; in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Moscow not 
only behaves like the protector of the Serbian entity, led by the nationalist Milorad Dodik, but 
militarizes and encourages the secessionism of the later from the Bosnian state34. Thus, in 
order to reinforce its influence, Russia intervenes in electoral processes and supports 
individuals, leaders, political parties and extremist groups that threaten peace in the region by 
distributing financial and military aid to them. One of the most striking examples is the failed 
coup in Montenegro aimed at eliminating politically and physically Montenegrin leader Milo 
Đukanović, known for his pro-Western sympathies. Meanwhile, in the southern Serbian city of 
Nish, Moscow has built a so-called “Russian humanitarian center”, suspected of being a 
military center of Russian intelligence services. Russia has for years been applying anti-NATO 
and anti-EU doctrine to Western Balkan countries. Moreover, unlike the West, Russia, 
interested in a situation of instability in the Balkans, opposed the Prespa agreements and 
encouraged the citizens of North Macedonia to boycott the popular consultation for the change 
of name of this country. 
With the exception of Serbia, and partly Bosnia and Herzegovina, all states in the region 
are now members of NATO (Albania, Montenegro), engaged in an accession process (North 
Macedonia) or have clearly expressed a demand in this direction (Kosovo). With the arrival of 
Montenegro in the Alliance, the entire Adriatic Sea is now under its control. Serbia remains the 
only country in the Western Balkans, or even the Balkans as a whole, through which Russia 
tries to maintain or re-develop its hegemonic influence in this region35. As a result, the Russian 
state continues to support Serbia, as it has done in the past. 
Serbia maintains ambiguous and antagonistic relations with the EU. On the one hand, it has, 
several years ago, adopted a policy of acceleration to European accession and, on the other 
hand, it pursues diplomacy contrary to that of the EU, by supporting Russia in the Ukrainian 
crisis in particular. As a result, Hoyt Brian Yee, a senior US State Department official in charge 
of European and Eurasian Affairs, made it clear that Serbia: “cannot sit on two chairs at the 
                                                          
34 Reuf Bajrović, Richard Kraemer, and Emir Suljagić, “Bosnia on the Chopping Block: The Potential for Violence 
and Steps to Prevent it”, Foregin Policy Research Institute, March 2018, pp. 5-10. 
35 Thomas E. Graham, Jonathan E. Levitsky, Cameron P. Munter, Frank G. Wisner, with Contributions by Mark D. 
Stadnyk, & Stephen C. Whittaker, “Time for Action in the Western Balkans. Policy Prescriptions for American 
Diplomacy”, East West Institute and National Committee on American Foreign Policy, New York, May 2018, p. 16. 
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same time, especially if they are that far apart”36. Therefore, in order to comply with the criteria 
for accession to the common European project, the candidate countries have the obligation to 
clearly display a European vision and to align themselves with the EU’s foreign policy. 
The Russian authorities are working tirelessly to strengthen anti-EU and anti-NATO 
sentiment in the Western Balkans. They encourage interethnic divisions through disinformation 
campaigns, deliberately fueling the tensions that led to the wars of the 1990s. The impact of 
this Russian strategy is consequent because opinion polls have shown that through the spread 
of such information Serbian citizens wrongly perceive Russia as a major contributor to Serbia 
long before the EU37. Indeed, Russia has put in place a complex communication strategy, 
served by substantial means in favor of some digital or traditional Serbian media. Similarly, 
Russian media are omnipresent, such as Sputnik, an international multimedia news agency 
formally launched by the Russian government in 2014 and broadcast in Serbian38. In addition, 
a number of press groups that frequently combine conspiracy theories and Serbian 
ultranationalism are funded by the Russian authorities in order to reinforce the world view of 
the Russian state: “[t]hese include periodicals and online portals such as Geopolitika, Vostok, 
News Front, Ruski ekspres, and Gazeta. Last but not least, there are local outlets that explicitly 
back the Kremlin (Pravda, Pečat, Oslobodjenje, Srbin.INFO, Snaga Naroda radio, and the 
Macedonian portal Infomax)”39. Moreover, Russian strategic communications are supported 
by a network of diverse organizations, ranging from government agencies to government-
supported non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which also include associations, student 
groups, political parties, and the Orthodox Church. 
Like Russia, Turkey has benefited from its emergence as well as from the European 
crisis to also growth its presence in the Western Balkans by increasing its all-round influence. 
In fact, because of the prevarications of the Europeans, Turkey, like the other emerging 
powers, has found a relative empty space to project itself. In the absence of a clear and 
strategic EU approach to the region, Turkish diplomacy is trying to fill a diplomatic void and 
strengthen its position as a regional leader40. Unlike its initially commitment during the 1990s, 
in the areas of, essentially, regional peace and stability, after the Justice and Development 
Party’s (JDP or AKP in Turk) victory in the 2002 parliamentary elections, Turkish foreign policy 
began a major shift. The arrival of the JDP has created a new dynamic in the Turkish view 
                                                          
36 Daniel McLaughlin, “Russia angry as US official tells Serbia to choose EU or Moscow”, The Irish Times, 
October 25, 2017, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/russia-angry-as-us-official-tells-serbia-to-
choose-eu-or-moscow-1.3268845, (accessed on May 8, 2019). 
37 European Union Institute for Security Studies with contributions from Antonio Missiroli, Jan Joel Andersson, 
Florence Gaub, Nicu Popescu, John-Joseph Wilkins ad al., “Strategic communications East and South”, Report, 
Paris, n° 30, July 20, 2016, p. 22. 
38 Ibid., p. 13. 
39 Ibid.  
40 Ronald H. Linden and Yasemin İrepoğlu, “Turkey and the Balkans: New Forms of Political Community”, Turkish 
Studies, vol. 14, Issue 2, 2013, p. 238. 
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towards the EU and penetration of the Western Balkans. To assert itself as a regional leader, 
Ankara has put in place a comprehensive, multifaceted, multidimensional, proactive, and so-
called “zero problem with all neighboring countries” strategy. Since the region has been under 
Ottoman rule for almost five centuries, the Turkish authorities have considerably intensified 
their efforts to increase their influence where possible. It mobilizes cultural, religious and 
historical aspects, sometimes economic features as starting points for the deepening 
penetration in many fields41. For example, countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, 
North Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro and Serbia occupy a particularly important and 
strategic place in Turkish foreign policy. In this perspective, Turkey has adopted and 
consolidated a new speech and presented a new vision as to its role in the WB6.  
Over the course of Erdoğan’s 17 years of leadership, Turkey has invested a great deal 
of effort and money to increase its political, cultural and economic influence in the Western 
Balkans. It has provided development assistance, conducted major infrastructure projects, 
opened schools and universities, built and/or rebuilt mosques, promoted Turkish investments 
in the region and promoted dialogue among peoples42. In short, Turkish political authorities 
and companies have invested in all strategic sectors that can promote national interests. 
Municipalities, the business community, NGOs, soap operas and individuals43, all have 
become important actors in Turkey’s relations with the Western Balkans. In 2002, the value of 
trade between the Western Balkans and Turkey amounted to some 435 million US dollars, but 
in 2016 this figure rose to 3 billion, about seven times as much44. By imitating EU policies, 
Turkey has invested heavily in human relations in order to develop the components of the 
Turkish soft power. By way of illustration, Birgül Demirtaş gives the example of the visa 
exemption for states of the Western Balkans, an initiative to create a visa-free zone in the 
region, that is to say a kind of Schengen area in Turkish style45. The influence is even more 
remarkable, at the socio-cultural level, it is a real emanation of soft power through, for example, 
television series or Turkish soap operas, broadcast during the hours of great listening and 
become very popular46. In addition, the Turkish Agency for International Cooperation and 
Development (TIKA) is funding numerous projects to rebuild the monuments dating from the 
time of the Ottoman Empire (mosques, bridges and schools). The Presidency of Turks Abroad 
                                                          
41 Birgül Demirtaş, “Turkish foreign policy towards the Balkans: A Europeanised foreign policy in a de-europeanised 
national context?”, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, vol.°XX, n° X, 2015, p. 10. 
42 Kerem Öktem, “Global Diyanet and Multiple Networks: Turkey’s New Presence in the Balkans”, Journal of 
Muslims in Europe, vol. 1, Issue 1, 2012, p. 31. 
43 Kemal Kirişci, “Turkey’s Engagement with Its Neighborhood: A ‘Synthetic’ and Multidimensional Look at Turkey’s 
Foreign Policy Transformation”, Turkish Studies, 13 (3), 2012, pp. 319-341. 
44 Mehmet Uğur Ekinci, “Turkey and the Western Balkans: Stable Relations and Deepening Cooperation”, in Sasha 
Toperich and Aylin Ünver Noi (eds.), Turkey and Transatlantic Relations, Washington DC, Center for Transatlantic 
Relations, 2017, pp. 167-169. 
45 Birgül Demirtaş, op. cit., pp. 9-10. 
46 Julien Paris, “Succès et déboires des séries télévisées turques à l’international. Une influence remise en 
question”, Hérodote, n° 48, 2013/1, p. 158. 
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and Related Communities (YTB), founded in 2010 and attached to the Office of the Prime 
Minister, coordinates the activities of NGOs and grants scholarships for students including 
those from the Western Balkans. The Yunus Emre Institute, a public foundation created in 
2007 to promote Turkish language, culture and art, operates through several cultural centers 
in all countries of the region. Moreover, the Presidency of Religious Affairs, a public institution, 
supports religious education. Turkey mobilized two dubious political instruments: religion, 
namely the politicization of Islam, and neo-Ottomanism which, as a new geopolitical doctrine, 
consists in virtually reconstructing the old imperial space.  
However, Western Balkan historians condemn all misfortunes inflicted on their 
countries during the Ottoman occupation. Official history generally describes the past as a 
centuries-long struggle to get freedom from the Ottoman yoke. According to Dimitar Bechev: 
“[a]s in the case of Greek, Bulgarian, Serb, Croatian and Romanian grand narratives, Albania’s 
struggle against Ottoman domination has been elevated into a contribution to the cause of 
rolling back Asiatic backwardness in the name of European civilization”47. 
China is also trying to expand and strengthen its influence and strategic presence in 
Europe including the Balkans. In 2012, it announced a new global initiative (16+1 initiative) for 
cooperation with sixteen countries of Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe (CESEE), 
including Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but not 
the state of Kosovo which is not yet officially recognized by Beijing48. The Chinese Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI), formerly called One Belt, One Road (OBOR), initiated in 2013 by 
President Xi Jinping and also known as the New Silk Road, in addition to Asia, Africa and Latin 
America, also includes the European continent in general and the Western Balkans region in 
particular through significant economic and financial investments. The Balkan Silk Road is the 
name given to the transport and logistics corridor that Beijing has started to establish in the 
Balkans under the BRI49. As part of this initiative, the Chinese are providing massive 
investments to carry out infrastructure projects in some Western Balkan countries50. This 
economic presence has grown significantly and has become increasingly visible since 2015. 
Trade links have been strengthened, including through some bilateral agreements. Regarding 
the implementation of projects, Serbia stands out as the key partner of Beijing in the Western 
                                                          
47 Dimitar Bechev, Constructing South East Europe: The Politics of Balkan Regional Cooperation, United Kingdom, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p. 70. 
48 Anastas Vangeli, “The impact of China”, in Resilience in the Western Balkans, ISSUE Report, n° 36, 2017, 
European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, p. 57. 
49 Jens Bastian, “The potential for growth through Chinese infrastructure investments in Central and South Eastern 
Europe along the ‘Balkan Silk Road’”, Report prepared by Jens Bastian for the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (with funding from the Central European Initiative), Athens/London, 2017, p. 4. 
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Balkans51  especially since, beyond the historical relations Sino-Serbian and a growing 
Chinese political presence in Serbia, the latter is targeted by the Chinese authorities as the 
main point of support of the investment strategy BRI52. According to some sources, the total 
value of the projects financed is estimated at 6.2 billion euros, of which 2.6 in Serbia, 2.1 in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 0.9 in Montenegro and 0.6 in North Macedonia. The domains 
supported mainly concern the following three sectors according to the order of importance: 
roads, energy, railways53. The Chinese presence is also growing in Albania and in Kosovo in 
recent years. 
But, as elsewhere in the world, in Africa for example54, such investments meet a 
strategic goal and are only granted in the expectation of a return. In this case, the geographical 
proximity of the Western Balkans to the EU, combined with their possibility to join the EU, 
represents an important prospect for Chinese economic operators to access the EU’s single 
market55. Strengthening the trade corridors used by Chinese companies aims to improve 
regional connectivity and, at the same time, facilitate the transport of goods to the European 
single market. In addition, Chinese projects tended to be treated outside normal project 
selection processes or procurement procedures56. 
Despite their increasing projection, the economic influence of the emerging powers 
remains far behind that of the EU. Indeed, there is a very strong economic interdependence 
between the EU and the Western Balkans. With 73% of trade exchange, the EU is by far the 
largest trading partner of the six Western Balkan states, followed by China with 5% and Russia 
with 4.8%57. The exchanges between the EU and the Western Balkans have doubled in 10 
years – from € 21.4 billion in 2006 to € 43.6 billion in 2016 – the EU was, in fact, the main 
market of the Western Balkans in 2016, 67% of imports and 83% of exports58. The enlargement 
process has opened up new business opportunities for EU and Western Balkan companies. 
Since 2000, almost all exports can enter the EU without customs duties or quantitative 
restrictions; thus, exports to the EU increased from € 7.337 billion (2006) to € 17.740 billion 
(2016), while imports from the EU increased from € 14.08 billion (2006) to 25.92 billion 
(2016)59. EU firms are by far the largest investors in the Western Balkans at 72.5%, followed 
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by Russia (4.6%), Switzerland (3.7%), Norway (3%) and Turkey (2%)60. In this sense, the 
Western Balkans have strong economic ties with the EU and the economic presence of the 
emerging powers does not generally worry Europeans; but they are especially concerned that 
Russia, China and Turkey may develop political and cultural influence to the detriment of the 
EU as the Western Balkan governments are free to establish close relations with partners who 
are less concerned with democratic standards than the EU. Thus, the projection of emerging 
powers in the Western Balkans poses some challenge for the EU. The current paradigm of 
international relations in the Western Balkans is part of the realistic theory, since strategic 
competition for power expansion is developing there. There are tendencies towards a 
multipolar competitive order in the Western Balkans, between the EU and the emerging powers 
(and the latters also among themselves), which have forced the European authorities to pay 
more attention to the region. 
 
4. The recent European enlargement initiatives in the Western Balkans 
 
While the EU has been the most visible player in the WB6 for over 20 years, the recent 
dynamics of emerging powers are seen as a direct threat to European interests. Their 
diplomatic and economic deployment therefore meets a response of the EU which wishes to 
maintain its authority in this region. Since 2014, some Member States and the EU have 
launched various European integration initiatives in the WB6 in order to remain the most 
important player in the region. The first of these is the Berlin Process which focused on regional 
cooperation, inter-connectivity and reconciliation in the Western Balkans. One hundred years 
after the outbreak of the First World War in Sarajevo, at the initiative of German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel, on August 28, 2014, the Berlin Conference was held to give new political 
support to the WB6 on the way towards EU accession61. Thus, this German diplomatic initiative 
is the starting point for the formalization of the Berlin Process, a term that took effect after the 
Berlin Conference (2014), followed by the Vienna (2015), Paris ( 2016), Trieste (2017) and 
London (2018). 
The second European initiative is the European Commission’s publication on 
February 6, 2018, of a document entitled: “A credible enlargement perspective for and 
enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans”62. In this official document, the European 
Commission has announced its new plan for the WB6. This EU enlargement strategy is 
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unambiguous and persevering: regional cooperation and good neighborly relations remain a 
prerequisite for the WB6, which aspires to join the European common project63.  
The Sofia Summit of May 17, 2018, is the third European initiative. At the first EU-
Western Balkans summit in Thessaloniki, the EU reaffirmed its unequivocal support for the 
European perspective of the Western Balkans. But the EU’s foreign policy has only produced 
declarations with little effect. Except for the case of North Macedonia, the EU and its Member 
States has been unable to resolve the bilateral conflicts in the Western Balkans. Fifteen years 
after the Thessaloniki summit, the second EU-Western Balkans summit was held in Sofia. It 
brought together heads of state or government from the 28 Member States, senior EU 
representatives and the leaders of the WB6. Bulgaria, which was at the time head of the EU 
Presidency, but also Austria, which followed it, have made the EU’s enlargement to the 
Western Balkans a priority. 
These three European initiatives in favor of enlargement to the WB6 are launched for 
a variety of reasons, including three main ones: firstly, those linked to the difficulties of 
enlargement towards the WB6 as well as growing Euroscepticism within the EU; secondly, 
those related to the new and changing geopolitical context on the European continent and 
around it, and third, those related to the European economic and financial crisis and its impact 
on the WB6. Firstly, the Berlin Process was launched in order to maintain, consolidate and 
even accelerate the momentum of the process of integration for WB6 into the common 
European project in the light of the increase of Euroscepticism within the EU and a large 
opposition from European citizens to a new enlargement. The refugee crisis that hit the EU, 
especially in 2015, was an opportunity for several extreme right-wing European parties to 
criticize the European project. Extreme right parties within the EU have adopted a position 
strictly in opposition to the European project64. After the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, in 
several EU member states, enthusiasm for further enlargement, especially towards WB6, is at 
a low level. The reasons given by some authors are both specific to the EU (“enlargement 
fatigue”) and WB6 (rule of law, corruption, unemployment, immigration, bilateral disputes)65. 
The Berlin Process was also launched at a time when many critics emerged in the WB6 with 
regard to the EU, accusing it of failing to keep its promises and neglecting the states of the 
region in recent years. Furthermore, popular support for EU membership varies from state to 
state in the Western Balkans. For example, annual surveys of the Balkan Barometer provide 
figures on the perceptions and expectations of public opinion in the WB6 about European 
integration. Thus, the results of 2018 show a favorable opinion of citizens of states such as 
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Albania (83%), Kosovo (84%), North Macedonia (59%) and Montenegro (53%) to European 
integration; as for Bosnia and Herzegovina66 and Serbia the responses are unfavorable 
because respectively 45% and 29% of citizens responded that accession to the EU is not a 
good thing67. Albania and Kosovo are the two most pro-European states, followed by 
Montenegro and North Macedonia. 
Secondly, the new initiatives have also taken place in a changing and turbulent 
geopolitical context on the European continent and in its immediate neighborhood. This is 
particularly in the context of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and conflicts in the Middle East 
and on the southern shore of the Mediterranean. Russia’s intention and continued efforts to 
increase its influence not only in Eastern Europe, but also in the Western Balkans sent a signal 
of distress to the EU and some of its Member States. As a result, Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea and its growing involvement in the WB6, especially in Serbia, and its interference in 
the internal affairs of North Macedonia and Montenegro are of concern to the EU and its 
Member States regarding the risks this poses for WB6 in particular and European collective 
security more broadly68. Russia’s involvement in these countries boosted the agenda of 
European enlargement and urged the Commission to retain 2025 as a plausible deadline for 
new memberships, especially for Serbia and Montenegro. Like Russia, the growing presence 
of Turkey and China in the region is not well received by Europeans, especially as these three 
countries try to propose alternative political models for WB6 and contrary to European values. 
Therefore, in promoting its enlargement strategy, the EU and its Member States also aimed to 
send a clear message not only to the WB6 but also implicitly to the emerging powers that the 
WB6 states are part of the European continent and their accession to the common European 
project has no other alternatives. 
Thirdly, the new European commitment comes in the context of the post-European 
economic and financial crisis (2008-2014) which had a considerable impact on the WB6. 
However, the crisis has not completely interrupted the dynamics of cooperation, although it is 
true that it has created a lot of difficulties for the WB6 in their path of European integration. 
Therefore, the new European initiatives have probably sent the strongest pro-European 
message to the WB6 since the Thessaloniki summit. 
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Conclusion 
 
The Western Balkan region is fairly open and vulnerable to a large number of foreign 
influences. The EU enlargement process has slowed down for reasons both internal and 
external to the WB6 and the EU itself. The political and economic problems of the WB6, 
combined with those of the EU and its Member States, have created a hostile context in which 
European regionalism has continued but slowed down. The enlargement process has 
difficulties due to the development of a sort of skepticism by European citizens, especially in 
the founding states, towards the EU and the European project in general. European 
procrastination has created a relative “power vacuum” favoring the penetration of the emerging 
powers such as Russia, Turkey and China in the region. In other words, the EU has for a long 
time been pursuing an incoherent policy towards the WB6, slowed down by complex 
administrative and bureaucratic procedures, while Russia, Turkey and China have invested 
the field without preconditions.  
The neglect of the WB6 mixed with the opening of various influences through the 
projections of the emerging powers constitute some threats, not only for the WB6 and their 
future prospects, but also for the EU and its Member States. On the one hand, Russia is 
offering the region of the WB6 exactly the opposite of the EU, namely: censorship, 
militarization, incitement to war, instability and non-accession to the EU and NATO. On the 
other hand, Turkey and China propose autocratic models, and non-democratic values and 
principles, both politically, economically and culturally. Thus, the multiple crises in and around 
the EU as well as the tense geopolitical situation in the WB6 have sent a signal of anxiety to 
the European leadership. Therefore, in the face of this changing internal and international 
context, the EU and some of its Member States have shown new awareness by launching 
three initiatives promoting enlargement: the Berlin Process (2014-2018), enlargement strategy 
of the European Commission (2018) and the Sofia Summit (2018). Their aim is to prepare the 
accession of the WB6 to the EU and to ensure and sustain long-term peace and stability in the 
region. Moreover, through these complementary initiatives, the Europeans have sent an 
important message to the WB6 and implicitly to the emerging powers, which are trying to 
strengthen their influence, that the accession of this region to the EU is a strategic priority for 
European diplomacy. Although peace has already been established, there are still bilateral 
disagreements in the WB6 that hinder progress towards the EU accession process. This 
explains why these states express the desire for greater involvement of the EU. Therefore, the 
launch of the European initiatives was more than necessary and welcome for the WB6. All 
countries responded favorably and their leaders have thus expressed their willingness to 
continue promoting European regionalism and to strengthen the dialogue and cooperation 
between them and with the EU. 
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